Using Game Theory to Understand Screening for Domestic Violence Under the TANF Family Violence Option

Soonok An,Jisung Yoo,Larry G Nackerud

doi:10.18060/16671

Abstract

Universal screening for domestic violence in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is required by most states, but its implementation is questionable. This paper employs game theory to conceptualize interactions between TANF applicants and frontline eligibility caseworkers. The intended outcomes of universal screening for intimate partner violence (IPV) – granting of a good cause waiver to IPV victims – are valid only by the assumption that caseworkers perform their roles. To grant a good cause waiver, TANF applicants and caseworkers should exchange two types of information: 1) disclosure of abuse by IPV victims and 2) notification of the availability of good cause waivers by caseworkers. This paper illuminates that intended outcomes of universal screening for IPV are difficult to achieve and discusses the applicability and limitations of game theory for policy evaluation.

Highlights

Universal screening for domestic violence in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is required by most states, but its implementation is questionable
An application of game theory in this paper examines how good cause waivers can be granted to victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) in TANF programs as intended by the Family Violence Option
This paper claims that the intended outcomes of universal screening for IPV–granting of a good cause waiver to victims of IPV–are difficult to achieve without accurate IPV screening

Summary

Players

The IPV screening in a TANF program is a two-person interaction between a TANF applicant and an eligibility caseworker. 2. Incomplete information: A TANF applicant and an eligibility caseworker make a decision with incomplete information. At the beginning of the IPV screening, a TANF eligibility caseworker does not know about a TANF applicant’s characteristic as an IPV victim. In game theory, such a characteristic is called a type or a state (Osborne, 2004). As a caseworker does not know the status of IPV among TANF applicants, the caseworker may subsequently face the following situations: a TANF applicant should signal the state of IPV to a caseworker, and the caseworker formulates a belief which is the probability 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 to each state of IPV of a TANF applicant consistent with the signal (Zamir, 2010)

Outcomes

Preferences

Findings

Discussion and Limitations