Abstract

In ecology, G-functions can be employed to define a growth function G for a population b, which can then be universally applied to all individuals or groups b i within this population. We can further define a strategy v i for every group b i . Examples for strategies include diverse behaviour such as number of offspring, habitat choice, and time of nesting for birds. In this work, we employ G-functions to investigate the evolutionary stability of the bacterial cooperation process known as quorum sensing. We employ the G-function ansatz to model both the population dynamics and the resulting evolutionary pressure in order to find evolutionary stable states. This results in a semi-linear parabolic system of equations, where cost and benefit are taken into account separately. Depending on different biological assumptions, we analyse a variety of typical model functions. These translate into different long-term scenarios for different functional responses, ranging from single-strategy states to coexistence. As a special feature, we distinguish between the production of public goods, available for all subpopulations, and private goods, from which only the producers can benefit.

Highlights

  • Since its discovery in 1977 [1], quorum sensing (QS) has received increasing attention as a mechanism of bacterial communication

  • We develop a mathematical model to investigate the evolutionary stability of QS, which results in a semi-linear parabolic system of equation, following

  • Following up on the private goods-hypothesis explained in Section 1, we assume that there is a private benefit associated with producing the public goods, e.g. a small percentage of the produced enzymes may cling to the producing bacteria

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Since its discovery in 1977 [1], quorum sensing (QS) has received increasing attention as a mechanism of bacterial communication. The bacteria secrete the siderophores and other virulence factors into the surrounding medium, where their benefit can be shared by all cells in the local population, leading to the term public goods [3,4], e.g., with the focus on kin selection in [5] or the conflict between individual and group interests in [6] Such a cooperative system is vulnerable to exploitation by non-cooperative cheaters. A fraction of the siderophores stay with their producer and provide some private benefit Several mechanisms, such as kin selection [20] and policing [21], have been described that could explain the evolutionary stability of cooperation and QS despite the advantages cheaters have in such a system.

The Basic Model
Cost and Benefit
Analysis
Models with Private Benefit
First Type of Model Terms with Monotonicity Property
Second Type of Model Terms
Numerical Simulations
Discussion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call