US Rapprochement with Laos and Cambodia: A Response

Abstract

Professor Thayer cites three main areas of cooperation that have influenced US rapprochement with Laos: Missing Action/ Prisoner of War (MIA/POW) issue, reduction of opium production and counter-terrorism. As he rightly contends, MIA issue remains at top of America's agenda Laos. To date, 240 sets of remains of American service personnel have been found and identified; search, led by US teams with Lao logistical support, for a further 355 MIAs continues. (1) Positive collaboration on this issue has unquestionably helped to improve relations between two countries. However, another legacy--unexploded ordnance (UXO)--of war constitutes a greater concern for Lao government. In 2009, United States committed around $5 million to UXO clearance and training programmes. Though funding represents one of largest US aid budgets Laos that year and an increase from previous year's $3.5 million, it still falls short of what is required. As recently as July 2010, a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a group of former US Ambassadors to Laos called on United States to make an annual commitment of $10 million over next ten years for UXO removal Laos. It may well be true that Laos agreed to cooperate with US on MIA issue order to get latter's assistance to clear country's rural areas of UXO, although one may argue that Laos has moral right to request this help. From 1964 to 1973 US aircraft dropped over two million tons of ordnance during nearly 600,000 bombing missions over country. (2) At end of war, it was estimated that 78 million unexploded cluster bomblets littered country's rural areas. (3) A recent survey by National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for UXO/Mine Action sector Laos indicates that some 50,000 people were maimed or killed by UXO between 1964 and 2008. (4) Counter-narcotics operations also remain a US priority Laos. With significant decline of opium cultivation, flow of, and addiction to, methamphetamines and amphetamines have emerged as another front US anti-drugs struggle Laos, though country is considered less as a site of production than as a pivotal transit area between Myanmar, Thailand and China. On other hand, counter-terrorism, another US priority Southeast Asia, is unlikely to generate much opportunity for cooperation between two countries: Laos is not known for being a place of shelter for individuals or groups that may be classified as terrorists or having international terrorist connections. In other words, United States does not have to devote many resources to cover Laos its global campaign against terrorism. Professor Thayer cites three sources of international influence on Lao regime: western countries and development agencies; international organizations; and China and Vietnam. With regard to Lao foreign policy, these sources are not of equal weight. Vietnam and China are, by far, Laos' closest political allies. Despite recurrent comments by foreign analysts on Sino-Vietnamese rivalry Laos, it seems exaggerated that Vietnam would encourage Laos to develop relations with US in order to counter increasing Chinese influence. In foreign policy, Vietnam has made remarkable progress since early 1990s, emerging from US embargo and international isolation to establish diplomatic and economic relations with many partners, including international organizations. However, regime's leaders--in particular within conservative circles--remain suspicious of US diplomatic and strategic intentions region, and, like Lao leadership, wary of the plot of peaceful evolution. It is therefore doubtful that Vietnamese would consider US as alternative influence to China such a close (both geographical and political terms) neighbouring country as Laos. More likely, Vietnamese regime supports Laos developing friendly relations with US (as with other developed countries) so as to ensure a stable regional environment conducive to economic growth and development. …