U.S. Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Observations on the Current Scene

Abstract

The United States will have to define its concept of engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Will it try to shape this process or will it wait until Arab leaders make enough concessions to interest Israel? The Reagan administration does not view the Arab-Israeli conflict as a serious threat to American interests. It sees no crisis to manage. Instead, it encourages Jordanians and Egyptians to clear the way for direct talks with Israel. In the current prenegotiation period, both sides of the conflict will have to decide to negotiate. This decision will require major changes in the political environment, as well as internal coalition building in support of concessions. Neither side is likely to negotiate unless the United States acts as a catalyst. The Reagan administration is moving toward doing something to stimulate the peace process, but it is reluctant to get out in front until it concludes that its role will be both painless and successful.