U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story

Abstract

Stephen G. Rabe, US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story, University of North Carolina Press, 2005, 240 pp.The implacable fear that Russian-led Communism would engulf countries in its backyard became an obsession verging on paranoia in America in early years of Cold War. The machinations of US presidents, especially John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, to avert this perceived Communist threat has formed grist for dozens of publications over past four decades. More specifically, role of covert operations of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and use of US trade unions as front for intervention in affairs of countries perceived as possible beachheads for spread of Communism have also been subject of numerous publications. Steven G. Rabe's, US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story, falls within this genre.Drawing heavily from recently declassified material, oral accounts and other secondary and primary sources, Rabe chronicles in exhaustive detail ways in which British Guiana's colonial ruler, Britain, was led to believe that democratically elected leader, Cheddi Jagan, was a rabid Communist and should be prevented, at whatever cost, from leading country into independence. Eventually British were corralled not only into accepting this viewpoint but also into permitting US to lead charge to achieve this goal. Rabe details escalating intensity of US interventions through channelling of funds from CIA via American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFLCIO) to foment and support strike actions by local trade unions opposed to government policies. Additionally, these funds were used to create new political parties and to support them and two main opposition parties, United Force (UF) and People's National Congress (PNC), to oppose governing People's Progressive Party (PPP) in national elections under a new constitutional arrangement, Proportional Representation (PR). The British had imposed this solution at instigation of US to ensure that Cheddi Jagan and his PPP would lose what was to be last election before independence. In a parallel theme, Rabe details courting of Forbes Burnham as less troublesome alternative to Jagan and implementation of measures to ensure that he emerged as leader through a coalition with UF after 1964 elections. After he led country into independence, US and Britain supported his government, despite its descent into authoritarianism, blatant discrimination and violence perpetrated against majority Indian population.Rabe, a professor of history, has written extensively on US foreign relations, especially with Latin America, as evidenced by his books: The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (1982); Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (1989); The Most Dangerous Area in World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (1999); and Debating Kennedy Presidency (2003). His expertise is demonstrated in impressive use of primary and secondary sources to illustrate countless instances of US intervention in British Guiana and pressure brought to bear on Britain to permit and support that intervention.However, his work throws into sharp focus limited range of primary sources that he consulted in dealing with actual happenings in British Guiana. This is of special significance since writer claims in Introduction that incorporating perspectives of British and Guyanese actors helps to avoid . . . 'the view from Washington syndrome. He draws his Guyanese perspectives almost exclusively from secondary sources, with no reference to any of seven contemporary local newspapers, not even Thunder or Mirror that Peoples Progressive Party published. He provides no interviews with local actors, many of whom are still alive, including some who were closely associated with Cheddi Jagan, against whom the great injustice, subject of this work, had been perpetrated. …