Us Institutional Terrorism Narrative on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda

Abstract

The US institutional terrorism narrative on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda has a distinctly different character than the previous narrative. The position, role, and power of the US president has been highly institutionalized through historic practices. In concert with military strikes and economic sanctions, the US terrorism narrative served to maintain existing domestic and international power relations through threat articulation and self-identification. Key events include the 1998 Embassy attacks and bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. President Clinton also securitized the Taliban for hosting Bin Laden, but economic sanctions against Afghanistan had a minimal effect and were possibly even counterproductive. Over time US identity became more articulated because of terrorism. Domestically, a diminishing factor in recontextualizing threat articulations was Clinton’s personal involvement with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Bin Laden’s motivations or historic and religious references as expressed in his declarations in the mid-1990s were distant and less of a concern for Americans than the threat of international terrorism to US vital interests. After the attack on the USS Cole, Clinton was in his last days of office and there was no clear securitization effort.