US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s Perspective

Abstract

Until very recently, the four and half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than glimmer of hope, detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground. (1) Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and half years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 provides American participants with counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for similar operations well into the second decade of this century. The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons. (2) First, the writing team canvassed and included far wider range of opinion and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving the doctrine wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed. To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions. This article offers an assessment on the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and one view of how it has been applied to operations in the field. The hypothesis is that FM 3-24 conveys an effective military doctrine. Although its utility to the soldier and marine is evident from the reports emanating from Iraq, it is equally clear that FM 3-24 is not the final answer. What David Galula identifies as the 80 percent political action formula is beyond the scope of FM 3-24, but it still needs to be addressed. (3) The article provides brief but necessary reminder of doctrine's function and identifies six criteria for evaluating doctrine to be utilized in examining FM 3-24, testing its theoretical effectiveness. It then offers commentary on counterinsurgency practice in Iraq in the light of the new doctrine before returning to Galula's missing 80 percent. The hypothesis is supported by interviews with authors of the doctrine, service members serving and others who have served in Iraq, post-operational reports, and the ever-growing body of literature. Some careful consideration has also been given to opinion pieces and editorials published in various media. Writing COIN Doctrine Writing counterinsurgency doctrine today faces two major hurdles. First, things have changed markedly since the problem was last considered. John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen, and Steven Metz are three contemporary authors who have pointed out that warning signs related to this change have existed for some time. …