U.S. -Chinese Rapprochement and Vietnam

Abstract

The U.S.-Chinese rapprochement marks a watershed in modern history. Whatever the outcome, it has inspired hope for further reduction of world tensions and has been welcomed as such by a majority of world public opinion. For continued enmity between the United States and the People's Republic of China two superpowers in their own rights was fraught with more and larger conflicts: perhaps more Korean and Vietnam wars, and maybe also an escalation from local to global conflict. A turn from confrontation to negotiation may then be seen as departure from the irrational to the rational, from a net loss relationship to positive accommodation. In fact, with reason prevailing and imperial ambitions excluded, the two powers share much more common than adverse interests. Separated geographically by the Pacific, the United States and China have no territorial claims on each other; and militarily China does not present any acute threat to the United States. Importantly, both countries were allies in World War II, and such issues as Taiwan, which stems from U.S. intervention in China's civil war, are bound to be settled with time, although they may be severe at the moment. But most important, the U.S. and Chinese economies are complementary. China urgently needs access to U.S. technology and industrial goods, while no country on earth could provide a wider market for the United States than mainland China. In view of these simple facts, one may wonder why this rapprochement came so late in time. The usual answer points to ideological fixation and cold war mentality. But are these features fully a matter of the past? And are the superpowers able to free themselves of mutual suspicions and power diplomacy? Nothing can be prejudged, and developments have to be watched closely. Judging from recent history of China, there has existed in Peking, at least from the midfifties, a latent strong desire to come to terms with the United States, despite all anti-imperialist protestations.1 The two main preoccupations of the People's Republic of China have long centered around security and economic growth. In both fields, relations with the United States could be of decisive importance. To a certain extent it was lack of response from the United States from the Bandung period onwards which reinforced extremist trends in Peking. Significantly, all the main upheavals in China the 'great leap forward' and the 'Great Cultural Revolution' included developed around the above two leading concerns and followed largely external set-backs, both in the realms of security and economy. And in the process, the U.S. 'paper tiger' was supplemented by the Soviet 'social imperialism'. But coming of age, the Chinese revolution seems now in need for a new trial to augment internal efforts with external realignment, and judges the situation ripe.