Abstract
Why did the second Bush administration decide to invade Iraq in 2003? This article suggests that the question can usefully be addressed by looking at the ways in which regime change in Iraq became part of bureaucratic politics within the US government – under successive administrations – following the unsatisfactory termination of the first Gulf War in 1991. It is contended here that the limitations on bureaucratic politics within the second Bush administration were important in that the path toward a presidential decision for invasion was cleared by the failure of the higher echelons of the national security bureaucracy under Bush to work effectively in exercising core functions of challenge and debate.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
