Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between geography and intra-governmental rent-seeking. Drawing on the Principal-Supervisor-Agent model as well as the classic Tullock rent-seeking model, a stylized model of rent-seeking within government is created where geographic proximity between public goods-providing agents and the agents who hire and supervise them affects the transaction costs of rent-seeking. From this model, several propositions are drawn about the effect of distance on government output. Results from an empirical analysis examining the relationship between capital city primacy and government effectiveness are largely consistent with the predictions of the model.
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