Abstract
AbstractThis paper analyzes the impacts of downstream CSR on upstream tacit collusion. Considering an infinitely repeated game with trigger strategy punishment, we find that how consumer‐oriented CSR affects the stability of upstream collusion basically hinges on the downstream competition modes. Specifically, CSR behavior facilitates (hinders) upstream collusion under downstream quantity (price) competition. For given degree of CSR and product substitutability, upstream collusion is always less stable under downstream price competition. In addition, higher degree of product substitutability obstructs collusion, regardless of downstream competition mode.
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