Upgrading the Bomb: Why and How the US Provides Advanced Nuclear Assistance to Junior Allies

Abstract

Abstract Why and how does the US provide advanced nuclear assistance to junior nuclear allies? Existing nuclear literature downplays the possibility that the US strategically employs the technical assistance option as a post-proliferation toolkit to control allied nuclear proliferation. Addressing the first question—why—I argue that the US provides advanced nuclear assistance to junior allies to inhibit the latter’s growing tendency towards unilateralism after nuclear acquisition, meanwhile inducing greater allied nuclear coordination. By forging advanced nuclear partnerships, the US seeks simultaneously to draw junior allies closer to the American nuclear leadership and establish coordinated nuclear strike plans and joint nuclear targeting. Addressing the second question—how—I claim that the US provides advanced nuclear assistance at a protracted pace and in a restricted manner, calculated to exert influence over recipient junior allies for as long as possible. To provide the plausibility probe of my argument, I explore two historical cases: The US’s strategic advanced nuclear assistance to the UK and to France. I conclude by identifying avenues for future study and the policy implications for China’s potential response to North Korea’s nuclear sophistication.