Abstract
We propose and axiomatically characterize update rules for the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J. of Math. Econ., 18, pp. 141-153, 1989) for decision making under ambiguity. These rules are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg's paradox) with dynamic consistency for all appropriately non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to subsets of the set of priors, where the specific subset depends on the preferences, the conditioning event, and the choice problem (i.e., a feasible set of acts together with an act chosen from that set).
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