Unwitting Wrongdoing, Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness

Abstract

This chapter defends the view (1) that when an agent is blameworthy for an action performed in ignorance of its wrongness, the blameworthiness for the action derives from blameworthiness for the ignorance, (2) that ignorance is culpable just in case (and because) the agent could reasonably have been expected to have known better through having taken measures that would have avoided or remedied this ignorance, and (3) that such reasonable expectations do not require that the agent acted akratically in the mismanagement of her beliefs at some point in her past. This commonsense, moderate position avoids the problematic implications of rival views that insist on a strong akrasia condition for blameworthiness and views that reject (1)–(3). The chapter’s aim is to defend the author’s view against objections that have been raised against it from both sides, and to raise objections to these rival views.