Abstract
‘Interconnectedness’ was considered to be a cause of the 2008 financial crisis, stimulating a number of studies into the topology of financial markets. Yet the analysis of instability within networks has tended to focus on a type of ‘contagion’ which imagines serial insolvencies, with non-performance of due obligations causing solvency issues for connected institutions. A more realistic assessment of the 2008 crisis was that it was due to a drying-up of available cash. A taxonomy of contagion is proposed, and the illiquidity model of contagion is then analyzed with reference to the observed core-periphery structure of financial market networks. Finally, the post-crisis reforms are judged against the view of ‘interconnectedness’ which emerges.
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