Abstract
Unregulated law clinics in England and Wales are prohibited from directly offering immigration advice and assistance. This article argues that this restriction should not be a barrier to teaching immigration law. Kant’s duty-based ethics and his cosmopolitan right can provide a useful normative framework for challenging the political status quo in relation to the regulation of law clinics and policies affecting migrants. It is argued that introducing normative values into Clinical Legal Education can address the limitations of the conventional ‘hired-gun’ model and engender students to a more holistic approach to lawyering. In other words, a model which promotes the causes of third parties.
Highlights
Kant’s moral philosophy, which is committed to respecting the dignity of all persons, will be applied to Clinical Legal Education (CLE) to critique the United Kingdom’s (UK) current laws and Reviewed Article policies towards migrants
This article has demonstrated that unregulated law clinics can engage, albeit indirectly, with immigration clients through a cosmopolitan approach grounded in a duty towards all individuals
There has been a gradual shift in recent years towards a more social justice-oriented approach in CLE (Nicolson, 2016; McKeown & Ashford, 2018)
Summary
CLE is generally understood to mean the provision of pro bono legal services to reallife clients, under the supervision of academic members of staff (Giddings, 2013). This article addresses the ethics component of CLE by incorporating a deontological dimension that goes beyond the traditional lawyering model This aim is achieved through the use of a case-study centred on the UK’s immigration law and policies. Incorporating cosmopolitan values into CLE can assist in addressing issues of bias towards clients This can be achieved through a moral duty-centred approach that promotes self-reflection. Kant (1948: [4: 398]) contrasts this example with that of a person who is naturally disposed to assist those in distress: Reviewed Article I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, right and amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth It stands on the same footing as other inclinations – for example, the inclination for honour, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely the performance of such actions, not from inclination, but from duty.. To determine our duties to the moral law, it is necessary to examine Kant’s supreme principle of morality
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