Unrecognized Philosophical Prejudices and Their Consequences in 'Scientific' Political Science

Abstract

Although most scientifically-oriented social scientists consider their research methodology to be free of philosophical commitments, it is in fact shot through with unrecognized, extra-scientific beliefs at all stages. Such unrecognized beliefs include i.a. ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological commitments. Because such beliefs go largely unnoticed, unanalyzed, and uncriticized, they tend to have the character of dogmatic prejudice. Since so few social scientists are even vaguely aware of the philosophical commitments entailed by their methodology, these beliefs exert a subtle, but dogmatic and tyrannical hold upon the teaching and research of so many of those in sympathy with the scientific study of politics. The principal aim of this paper is to lay bare some of these philosophical commitments, and to show some of the problems bound up with these assumptions. The minefield is navigable, but it is littered with problems which cannot be ignored without peril.