Abstract
AbstractAccording to Hobbes, individuals care about their relative standing in a way that shapes their social interactions. To model this aspect of Hobbesian psychology, this paper supposes that agents have social preferences, that is, preferences about their comparative resource holdings. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unravelling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. This Trust-unravelling Model incorporates important features of Hobbes’s argument that past models ignore.
Highlights
Hobbes purports to demonstrate that life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1991: 89) – but how, exactly, does he prove this? Beginning with classic works by David Gauthier and Gregory Kavka, several theorists have employed the techniques of game theory to clarify the structure and content of Hobbes’s argument
We propose our reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument, which begins by identifying a special class of cumulative distribution function (CDF)
It’s important to note that our distinction between dominators and unconditional defectors is possible only because we have introduced distinctively social preferences that better capture Hobbesian psychology than past models
Summary
Hobbes purports to demonstrate that life in the state of nature is ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1991: 89) – but how, exactly, does he prove this? Beginning with classic works by David Gauthier and Gregory Kavka, several theorists have employed the techniques of game theory to clarify the structure and content of Hobbes’s argument. Older models generally exhibit two major shortcomings They often include only one type of player, ignoring the diversity that Hobbes explicitly ascribes to individuals in the state of nature. They typically ignore the issue of trust or uncertainty, even though Hobbes identifies ‘diffidence of one another’ as a key factor driving the emergence of war (Hobbes 1991: 87–88). These desiderata, defined, identify ways to improve upon first wave models in developing an adequate game-theoretical reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument. Two other models, those of Vanderschraaf and Chung, have made important advancements in meeting these desiderata.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
