Unpopular Policies and the Imperative of Justification: Putting the Monti Government’s Reform Communication in a Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Governments’ policy organization and communication, treated as an independent variable, has been shown to increase the public endorsement of unpopular reforms and to help to avoid blame. This study aims to shed further light on such strategic action from a largely neglected angle. It considers reform communication as a dependent variable and makes the case that the content of this communication does not so much depend upon blame avoidance motives but is primarily a function of contextual factors conditioning the limits and resources for a convincing communication. Using the Italian Monti government as a case where blame avoidance can be expected to be least likely, the analysis nonetheless shows clear features that resemble blame avoidance strategies for this case, namely a pronounced risk framing and justifications based on political cooperation. This communication can however, it is argued, be made plausible in light of political-institutional, political-cultural and economic circumstances.