Abstract
MANY RECENT aestheticians have criticized the notion of disinterest. The aestheticians in question take the notion to have a vaguely Kantian pedigree. And in attacking this notion, they think of themselves as attempting to remove a corner-stone of Kant's aesthetics. This procedure is hardly likely to be effective if what they attack bears little resemblance to Kant's original notion. In this brief note, I want to show how far these anti-Kantian aestheticians have missed their mark. I need a characterization of Kant's notion if I am to distinguish it from the newfangled notions. In section 2 of the Critique of Judgement, Kant claimed that pleasure in the beautiful is 'disinterested'. In order to explicate this claim, he wrote:
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