Unjust inequalities. Is maximin the answer?

Abstract

Abstract A maximin criterion of distributive justice provides an attractive way of articulating a concern for equality and a concern for efficiency. It recommends that one should equalize income, expected advantages, opportunities or whatever else matters for the sake of distributive justice up to the point from which further equalization would make the worse off even worse off once its consequences are taken into account. But is the maximin criterion egalitarian enough? Does it pay enough attention to the impact of inequalities on political power, to the equal dignity of all citizens or to the value of fraternity? Is the maximin criterion not instead too egalitarian? Does it pay enough attention to a priority legitimately claimed by one’s own community, to democratically expressed preferences or to the value of reciprocity? This contribution clarifies the maximin concept, discusses these various objections and concludes that a maximin approach remains essential to identify, if not just inequalities, at least justifiable ones.