Abstract

Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently, it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear but also up to higher orders in selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results, such as the one-third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.

Highlights

  • In evolutionary game theory the outcome of strategic situations determines the evolution of different traits in a population1͔

  • The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations is governed by the intensity of selection

  • How universal is weak selection for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation probability and the average fixation time up to linear and up to higher orders in selection intensity

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

In evolutionary game theory the outcome of strategic situations determines the evolution of different traits in a population1͔. An important result of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations under weak frequency dependent selection is the one-third rule. It relates the fixation probability of a single type A individual, ␾1, to the position of the internal equilibrium x‫ ء‬in a coordination game, i.e., when a Ͼ c and d Ͼ b. Lessard and Ladret showed that the onethird rule is valid for any process in the domain of Kingman’s coalescence28͔, which captures a huge number of the stochastic processes typically considered in population genetics This class of processes describes situations in which the reproductive success is not too different between different types. Some detailed calculations can be found in Appendixes A and B

PROBABILITIES OF FIXATION
Pairwise comparison
Moran process
TIMES OF FIXATION
DISCUSSION
General pairwise comparison process
Moran processes
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