Universality in Morality: Between Objectivity and Absolutivity

Abstract

This article discusses the internal theoretical problems of the discourse of moral universality, which are causing its external criticism. In particular we reconstruct the difficulties faced by the discourse of universality when it tries to reconcile the ideas of law and action. At the first stage, we reveal the reason why the tragic choice becomes a “stubborn fact” of the discourse of universality. It turns out to be a formal interpretation of the idea of universality, which is based on the presumption of the identity between the being of action ad the thinking about action. Since the possibility of an action and, as a consequence, the possibility of morality, is based on the non-identity of being and thinking, “universality in morality” is assessed as a contradictio in adjecto. At the second stage, we propose an alternative interpretation of the idea of moral universality, based on the divergence of metaphysical identity. At the third stage, we demonstrate that the source of criticism of the idea of moral universality is the confusion of two interpretations of universality and the substitution of a substantial interpretation by a formal one. At the fourth stage, we carry out a synthesis of formal and substantial interpretations of moral universality, including its meaningful normative concretization. We conclude that the source of criticism of the idea of moral universality is the conjugation of universality and objectivity (regarded as a main principle of the Modern Age thought). Universality retains its status as a substantial feauture of the concept of morality, like the status of the moral absolutivity (“voice of conscience”) in ethical theory.