Abstract
In the study of legislative voting behavior, theoretical and empirical work has focused mainly on the description and explanation of patterns of conflict. However, scholars working within the rational choice framework have recently drawn attention to the importance of the coalition, which is characterized by a high degree of consensus among the voting membership. So far, evidence of the universalistic coalition has been restricted to specific policy areas at specific points in time. This analysis examines the prevalence of the universalistic coalition on roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921-80, and contrasts it with party behavior over these same years. The results indicate a strong inverse relationship between universalistic behavior and partisan conflict. Two explanations of their interconnectedness are offered.
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