Universalism and individualism

Abstract

James Q. Wilson's Moral Sense is a wide-ranging and impressive study of sources of human moral behaviour. Its attempt to rehabilitate notion of natural human moral dispositions, by calling on resources of moral sense theories of eighteenth century, bolstered by much recent empirical work in psychology and sociology, is a welcome alternative to fashionable preoccupation with rational choice (and other instrumentalist) accounts of origins of moral principles. Wilson's account is not without its problems, of course, and in this article I will examine one important issue where difficulties arise. This is question examined in chapter entitled The Universal Aspiration, concerning relationship between moral dispositions and universality of scope so often - specially since Kant - picked out as a distinguishing mark of moral domain. As Wilson notes, although it is a commonplace in modern western cultures to understand moral concerns to be universal in scope (and therefore, we might add, to denounce failings of universality as irrational restrictions, as mere prejudice), it is not time-honored view of all human societies. In fact, understanding oneself as under important obligations which extend beyond membership of one's own group is a striking development which has come late on scene of human experience. He puts it as follows: The most remarkable change in moral history of mankind has been rise - and occasionally application - of view that all people, and not just one's own kind, are entitled to fair treatment.(1) This is indeed a striking development, and Wilson's sketch of an explanation is intriguing. In brief, he argues that it stems from unexpected sources: the growth of universalism and individualism was product, in part, of rise of consensual marriages and existence of private property [214]. former was promoted by medieval church, especially in north-western Europe, and latter had its earliest origins in England. This account enables Wilson to enjoy casting an ironical eye in direction of less self-critical of modern intellectuals: they be surprised to learn that they are taking advantage of opportunities created by Catholic church and English farmers starting in twelfth century [221]. Wilson admits that this account is tentative and, at best, partial, and he is surely right to do so. However, it is also necessary to inquire: Exactly what is he offering an account of? point of question can be quickly identified by remembering that this chapter purports to be an explanation of source of modern universalism, but, in one of passages already quoted above, we are told that it is growth of universalism and individualism which is being explained. How did individualism get into this picture, and what is its significance? It seems to me that in Wilson's account individualism enters in two ways, but that these ways are not entirely compatible. first way is not explicitly stated, but is implicit in his practice. To see this, we need to spell out bare bones of his argument in chapter. It can be set out as follows. Wilson first notes that rise of universalism can only imperfectly be explained by identifying universalist themes in Stoicism and Judeo-Christian tradition. He then develops an account which, in main, amounts to showing how forms of individualism arose in medieval west and broke down clan structures which preserved communalist mentality of distinguishing insiders, to whom one owed obligations, from outsiders, to whom one did not. On this account, role of individualism would appear to be merely instrumental: By destroying clan structure and clan mentality, individualist developments generated a moral void which universalism was then able to fill. Of course, universalism could not fill this void if it was thought to be at odds with individualism under whose wing it flourished. …