Abstract
The financing arrangements embodied in the Clinton health reform plan involve some important differences in the way in which public goods are usually financed. The subsidies to small, low-wage firms mandated to provide benefits distort markets in both labor and products, and offer incentives for the creation of small firms. In addition, the financing scheme implicitly envisions a head tax on families at modest income levels but offers a possible rationale for it. Nevertheless, the main reason for many of the financing features appears to be an attempt to hold down the apparent budgetary cost of universal coverage.
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Schedule a callMore From: The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association
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