Abstract
Why did decade-long US security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria fail to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread? There is little agreement among scholars on the impact and implications of US security engagements in Nigeria on the military’s counterterrorism strategies. I argue that disconnects between the components and dimensions of US–Nigeria security cooperation are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. I develop the concept of ‘unwilling’ and/or ‘less cooperative states’ to underscore the vulnerability of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their disconnectedness/asynergy with their foreign counterterrorism partners.
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