Abstract
In this paper, we study the effects of introducing endogenous costs in aTullock model of rent-seeking. We show that unions can be efficiencyimproving, and that the firms' levels of effort depend more critically uponthe number of firms participating in the contest when unions are present. Wethen study the effects of market integration in a two-country setup.Integrating two initially separate markets is shown to decrease union setwages, but is nevertheless beneficial to firms of both countries only if thereare sufficiently few contestants. However, unions and firms in one countrymight benefit from integration if their resident country is sufficiently largecompared to the post-integration market.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
