Unintended outcomes effects of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund on Hungary's public sector and administrative reforms

Abstract

This article investigates European Union and International Monetary Fund influence on Hungary's public sector reforms in the period 2004–2013, that is, a time period that saw the initiation of the European Union's Excessive Deficit Procedure (the whole period) and an International Monetary Fund bailout programme (2008–2010). In this case, public sector reforms became derailed from the externally proposed trajectory and took the opposite direction: instead of fostering decentralization of the state administration and deepening the Europeanization process, Hungary's restructuring of the public sector delivered centralization and a ‘power grab’ that eventually impinged on some core values of the European Union ‘constitution’ (the acquis communautaire). This study aims to explain this empirical puzzle by in-depth analysis of how external influence was exerted and became interwoven with dynamically changing domestic factors in circumstances of conditionality. The research is framed by existing policy transfer and public sector reform theories. The article argues that the Hungarian case provides evidence of the unintended consequences of European Union-driven public sector reforms.