Unilateral Orders as Constituency Outreach: Executive Orders, Proclamations, and the Public Presidency

Abstract

Scholarship on the unilateral presidency has focused on presidential policy making with the stroke of a pen. However, such studies overlook the influence that the public presidency can have on shaping the president's unilateral strategies. Our research question seeks to link these two elements by exploring the following question: under what conditions do presidents issue executive orders and proclamations as part of their public presidency? Using new data charting the use of these directives to target populations in society, we analyze the role of the political environment on engendering both more constituency‐based executive orders and proclamations. The results suggest presidents issue more constituency‐based proclamations, but not executive orders, when Congress and the executive branch are more likely to disagree on policy or when Congress is institutionally stronger compared to the president. Presidents are less likely to issue these orders during election years (for proclamations), in changing popularity, or when their party has returned to office. The implications suggest the importance of broadening the study of unilateral orders to link the public and administrative presidencies.