Uniform vs. retailer-specific pricing: How a supplier responds to the dominant retailers’ markup pricing strategy

Abstract

This paper investigates how dominant retailers should choose appropriate markup pricing strategies (a fixed-dollar markup, or a percentage markup), and how their supplier responds by choosing wholesale pricing strategies (a retailer-specific wholesale pricing, or a uniform wholesale pricing). Our results show that, all other things being equal, the uniform wholesale pricing strategy weakens the position of the retailers in the supply chain and thus is more favorable for the supplier. Specifically, when both retailers choose the same markup scheme, it is better for the supplier to choose the uniform wholesale pricing strategy since it can lead a higher profit for himself. The uniform wholesale pricing strategy also benefits the whole channel and the end-consumers, but hurts the dominant retailers. When the two retailers choose different markup schemes, the best choice for the supplier will still be the uniform wholesale pricing scheme if the level of downstream competition is sufficiently high; otherwise, the supplier would prefer the retailer-specific wholesale pricing scheme. The preference of the retailer using fixed-dollar markup pricing is just the opposite as compared to that of the supplier, while the retailer using percentage markup pricing always prefers retailer-specific wholesale pricing. Besides, the uniform wholesale pricing is beneficial to the whole channel. After anticipating the supplier’s reactions, both retailers are better off choosing percentage markup pricing no matter which wholesale pricing strategy the supplier chooses and what the level of competition is. Therefore, the final equilibrium would be the case where the dominant retailers choose the percentage-markup variant and the supplier always responds by adopting the uniform pricing scheme no matter what the level of bcompetition is. This equilibrium enhances the supply chain efficiency and benefits the end-consumers since it leads to the highest channel profits and the lowest retailing prices. Moreover, under this equilibrium, the supplier gets better while the retailers get worse as the level of competition increases.