Abstract
William Whewell's philosophy of scientific discovery is applied to the problem of understanding the nature of unification and explanation by the composition of causes in Newtonian mechanics. The essay attempts to demonstrate: (1) the sense in which ‘approximate’ laws (e.g. Kepler's laws of planetary motion) successfully refer to real physical systems rather than to (fictitious) idealizations of them; (2) why good theoretical constructs are not badly underdetermined by observation; and why, in particular, Newtonian forces are not conventional and (3) how empiricist arguments against the existence of component causes, and against the veracity of the fundamental laws, are flawed.
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