Unequal opportunities, social groups, and redistribution: Evidence from Germany

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the generalizability of the role of unequal opportunities and social group membership in redistributive preferences and examine the interaction between these two dimensions. We present results from a large-scale online experiment with more than 4,000 participants from Germany. The experiment consists of a real-effort task and a subsequent dictator game with native Germans and immigrants to Germany. We find that dictator transfers to the own group by native Germans and immigrants are higher under unequal opportunities than under equal opportunities. While we confirm the main findings reported in previous literature regarding the role of inequality of opportunity in redistribution for native Germans and immigrants, we find distinctively different patterns between both groups concerning the influence of social group membership and its interaction with unequal opportunities on redistribution. In particular, contrary to natives, immigrant dictators transfer more to in-group than to out-group receivers under unequal opportunities and do not compensate for unequal opportunities of out-group members. We conclude that in order to increase the understanding of patterns reported in the literature, it is crucial to also investigate the generalizability of findings to individuals from the general population and to explicitly cover participants such as immigrants who represent important parts of our society.