Unequal Contest: Iranian Nuclear Proliferation Between Economic and Value Symmetry

Abstract

The showdown with Iran on the nuclear issue may well be one of the most influential crises in the post-cold war era. Prevailing theories of asymmetrical interdependence, the backbone of orthodox understandings of globalization and post-modern cooperation, foster the expectation that Iran should comply with UN demands and stop its uranium enrichment programme. Why is Iran not backing down on its nuclear aspirations, despite its asymmetrical interdependence? In this article, we draw on the neo-liberal insights of R. Harrison Wagner to argue that contrary to conventional assumptions, asymmetrical interdependence is not enough for predicting bargaining outcomes. Rather, it is essential to ask how much the targeted state values the goods that it is being asked to forgo. Drawing on this central observation, Iran's non-compliance is much easier to explain, as are the most effective courses of action to deal with it. Iran is non-compliant, despite orthodox neo-liberal assumptions, because it values its nuclear options more than the costs being imposed on it, and likely to be further imposed, from non-compliance. This perspective suggests that policies based on manipulation of asymmetrical economic interdependence are unlikely to succeed. Outside actors must change the paradigm of the past 20 years, taking Iran's high resolve into account. The carrot-or-stick package must find carrots that are lucrative enough, and threats that are credible enough, to convey the high costs of non-compliance and the benefits of cooperation.