Unemployment, wages and collective bargaining in the European Union

Abstract

This article questions the predominant view on unemployment and wages in the European Union, according to which high unemployment is primarily caused by labour market rigidities, i.e. social institutions and regulations which prevent ‘market-clearing’ real wage levels and structures. The article shows that the foundations of that view coming either from neoclassical or New Keynesian theory are not convincing, neither theoretically nor empirically. Analysis of the developments in the EU during the last four decades shows that the claimed positive relationship between real wage growth and unemployment cannot be found. On the contrary, persistently high unemployment has had strong adverse effects on nominal wage growth and on the labour income share. Weakened union bargaining power and changing collective bargaining structures have contributed to this result. This article therefore concludes that the current EU economic and employment policies aiming at further wage restraint, wage differentiation and decentralisation of collective bargaining are deeply misguided and need to be replaced by an alternative wage policy as part of a growth- and employment-oriented coordination of macroeconomic policies.