Unemployment Insurance in Macroeconomic Stabilization

Abstract

Does the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) have a role to play in macroeconomic stabilization? When inefficient fluctuations arise from nominal rigidities and constraints on monetary policy, I demonstrate that it does, owing to the interaction between UI and aggregate demand. From a positive perspective, a marginal increase in UI generosity affects output and employment through a redistribution effect on aggregate demand. From a normative perspective, two forces determine optimal generosity beyond the classic trade-off between insurance and incentives: an aggregate demand externality and an effect of low aggregate demand on the social cost of disincentives. The aggregate demand externality summarizes the welfare impact of the redistribution effect when the economy is slack; both are governed by the difference in marginal propensities to consume between the unemployed and employed. Quantitatively, a calibrated model with search frictions, incomplete markets, and a binding zero lower bound suggests that the 2008–13 UI benefit extensions in the U.S. had important stabilization effects through these channels. Compared to counterfactual benefit durations capped at 9 months in the calibrated model, the extensions to 22 months prevent a 2-5 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate and generate a strict Pareto improvement.