Une psychiatrie sans esprit ?

Abstract

Philosophy of Mind is currently one of the most prolific fields of research in philosophy and has witnessed a progressive hybridization with cognitive science. It focuses on fundamental questions to neuroscience and psychiatry, such as the nature of mental states and cognitive processes, or the relationships between mental states and the world. Anticipating the accumulation of experimental data from neuroscience, it provides a framework for the generation of theories in cognitive science. Philosophy of mind has thus laid the foundations of the conceptual space within which cognitive sciences have spread: a large part of contemporary theories in cognitive science result from a hybridization of conceptions forged by philosophers of mind and data produced by neuroscientists. Yet contemporary psychiatry is still reluctant to feed on the philosophy of mind, other than through the fragments that emerge from neuroscience. In this paper, we describe the evolution of contemporary philosophy of mind, and we detail its contributions around three central themes for psychiatry: naturalization of mind, mental causality, and subjectivity of mental states. We show how philosophy of mind provide the conceptual framework to link different levels of explanation in psychiatry: from biological to functional, from neurophysiology to cognition, from matter to mind.