Abstract
We analyze the problem of existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. A Nash equilibrium is undominated if no player's equilibrium strategy is weakly dominated by another pure strategy. We show the existence of the least and the greatest undominated equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies of these extremal equilibria are undominated against mixed strategies as well and have nice comparative statics properties.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.
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