Understanding the Policy Responses of the Philippines towards China’s Economic Statecraft under the Duterte Administration

Abstract

Abstract This essay is a preliminary study of the Philippines’ foreign policy towards China under President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. It will examine China’s economic statecraft as the sender country towards the Philippines as the target country. The ultimate goal of China’s economic policies is to foster a submissive response from the Philippines over their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This paper applies the theoretical model proposed by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman (2008 and 2013) to study the political theory of economic statecraft, as applied by the sender and target countries. Blanchard and Ripsman argue that domestic factors serve as significant intervening variables in the strategy of the target country’s leaders towards the sender country. Thus, the target country’s leaders will view the sender country’s economic sanctions or economic inducements differently, depending on the domestic socioeconomic situation. By looking at the Duterte administration in the Philippines, this paper intends to expand upon the research agenda of the theory on economic statecraft and international relations. It will shine a light on the puzzling flip-flop of the Philippines’ foreign policy strategy. It shows that Blanchard and Ripsman’s “stateness” conditionalist approach provides a plausible explanation of the Filipino response to China’s economic statecraft. Instead of relying on conventional neo-realist, economic liberalist, or regime-type conditionalist arguments, this paper will focus on the control of leaders over the decision-making environment. However, it does acknowledge that stateness does not fully explain the Philippines’ strategic adjustment towards China, as international variables could have affected the Philippines’ policy response to China’s economic statecraft. This paper, therefore, argues that domestic and international factors play vital roles in affecting the dynamics in the target state and the effectiveness of the sender state’s economic statecraft.