Abstract
ABSTRACT Ad hoc coalitions offer flexible responses to Africa’s security challenges. This article provides a comparative study of two such groupings: the Multinational Joint Task Force, which has endured, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which has collapsed. To explain these divergent outcomes, we begin by assessing and comparing the performance capabilities of these coalitions. We then review the “classic account” of their (under)performance, which focuses on the role of external support in sustaining coalitions. Finally, we use an organized hypocrisy lens to show how external funding only ensures a coalition’s sustainability if, firstly, political relations between participating countries and between them and donors align; and secondly, the decoupling between discourse and performance does not become too great.
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