Abstract

Inadmissible information may come in a variety of forms including pretrial publicity and in-court statements made by witnesses or attorneys. A number of remedies have been proposed for controlling the damaging effects of such evidence. When inadmissible information comes in the form of pretrial publicity, judges may issue a continuance or rely on voir dire to remove biased jurors. In addition, it has been argued that deliberations may serve as an effective remedy. Finally, judges may issue an admonition to disregard pretrial publicity or other inadmissible evidence presented in court. Empirical research has demonstrated that such safeguards are relatively ineffective and sometimes produce a backfire effect, resulting in jurors being more likely to rely on inadmissible information after they have been specifically instructed to disregard it. Several social psychological theories provide explanations for the failures of admonitions, including belief perseverance, the hindsight bias, reactance theory, and the theory of ironic processes of mental control. Existing inadmissible evidence research and relevant social psychological theories are reviewed. The article concludes with a discussion of theoretically based policy recommendations. A basic tenet of jury trials is that jurors are supposed to render a verdict based on admissible evidence presented during the course of a trial. Information is admissible when it is relevant to the case at hand and has probative value. Of course, not all testimony that is relevant and informative is admissible. Information that was illegally obtained, is redundant, misleading or confusing to the jury, or is extremely prejudicial can be ruled inadmissible. Jurors can be exposed to inadmissible information from a variety of sources. This exposure may occur prior to the start of a trial in the form of pretrial publicity (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; Moran & Cutler, 1991). It may also occur during a trial via statements made by attorneys or witnesses regarding a defendant's past criminal behavior (Greene & Dodge, 1995), coerced confessions (Kassin & McNall, 1991; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980), or other incriminating information (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Pickel, 1995; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981). Because jurors should not consider this type of information in their

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