Abstract

This article aims to enrich the literature on EU sanctions in two ways. First, it argues that the absence of material sanctions does not imply a non-response. When faced with human rights violations, policymakers enjoy a third option besides exerting material pressure or refraining from intervening. They may instead employ what constructivist scholars call social sanctions. This option consists of verbally calling out the violators, either publicly, through a naming-and-shaming strategy, or diplomatically via political dialogue and demarches. Social sanctions can be a credible alternative or complement to material sanctions. Second, we argue for the importance of disaggregating the EU as a sender of sanctions. A non-response by executive institutions does not mean that the EU as a whole is standing idly by. Looking at social sanctions alongside material ones more accurately describes the choices policymakers face when designing their response to human rights violations. We demonstrate the value of our arguments by examining the EU’s various responses to LGBTI rights violations in Lithuania and Uganda.

Highlights

  • How do states or international organisations respond to violations of fundamental human rights? This ques‐ tion can be answered dichotomously: They either exert pressure to try to change the wrongdoers’ behaviour or refrain from intervening

  • To illustrate the added value of our argument, we examine how the EU responded to violations of LGBTI rights in Lithuania and Uganda

  • How does the EU act when a member state violates the fundamental rights of LGBTI people? To answer this ques‐ tion, we look at a specific case that did not result in mate‐ rial sanctions: revisions to the Law on the Protection of Minors Against the Detrimental Effects of Public Information in Lithuania

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Summary

Introduction

How do states or international organisations respond to violations of fundamental human rights? This ques‐ tion can be answered dichotomously: They either exert pressure to try to change the wrongdoers’ behaviour or refrain from intervening. Politics and Governance, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 1, Pages 79–89 for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU empha‐ sized that “the European Union doesn’t only have sanc‐ tions in its toolbox, we have many other instruments we can use....We have the instruments for pressure, we have leverages for good” (Herszenhorn, 2016) These words illustrate that the choice between imposing mate‐ rial sanctions and doing nothing is a false dilemma. The objective is instead to convince readers that they should inte‐ grate social sanctions and inter‐institutional differences into their analysis of material sanctions If this message is well received, we invite our colleagues to take this line of research further by explaining variation in how policymakers react to human rights violators. The conclusion summarizes our main findings, relates them to the other contributions of the thematic issue, and provides some suggestions for future research

Social Sanctions
Inter‐Institutional Differences
The EU’s Response to Internal Violations of LGBTI Rights
European Parliament
European Commission
The Council of the EU
The EU’s Response to External Violations of LGBTI Rights
The European External Action Service
The European Parliament
Conclusion
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