Understanding Subjectivities in the Regulation of Local Water Services: A Q-Methodology Study of Elected Public Officers in Italy

Alberto Asquer

doi:10.3390/w6030670

Abstract

In sub-national governments, elected public officers can exercise considerable influence on the regulation of local water services, in such ways as, for example, contributing to the design of local regulatory institutions, to the formulation of tariff rules, and to the supervision of water firms. Relatively little we know, however, about how elected public officers think about the regulation of local water services. This Q methodology study provides some evidence of the variety of opinions held on how local water services are delivered, how well they perform, and how they should be regulated among elected public officers in local governments in Italy. The study shows that the policy discourse on water regulation in Italy is highly fragmented into alternative and partially conflicting views. These findings bear some relevance for better understanding sources of stability and change of water regulatory regimes at the local level.

Highlights

The regulation of local water services typically leaves considerable room for agency by elected public officers, who are able to shape, and sometimes to determine, the institutional design for the provision of local water services
Water 2014, 6 concerning whether local water services should be delivered by local government owned firms or tendered out to business firms that are subjected to the terms and conditions stipulated in concession or franchise contracts
This study provides an analysis of the subjectivities of elected public officers towards the regulation of local water services in Italy

Summary

Introduction

The regulation of local water services typically leaves considerable room for agency by elected public officers, who are able to shape, and sometimes to determine, the institutional design for the provision of local water services. In the “public interest” theories of regulation, individuals who hold public authority positions are typically assumed to supply regulation taking into account the interest of the society [1,2,3]. In the “private interest” or “capture” theories of regulation, individuals are assumed to rationally pursue their own interest, especially in the form of transfer of wealth or attainment of rent positions through the formulation of fitting regulations [4,5,6]. In both these streams of theoretical work, individuals’

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Conclusion