Understanding seasoned equity offerings of Chinese firms

Abstract

We examine the empirical relevance of standard theories explaining the motivation of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the Chinese context. Analyzing Chinese SEOs during 1994–2008 and controlling for other factors reflecting features of Chinese corporate finance, we find that Chinese SEOs are mostly motivated by timing the market. Financing for investment and growth receives weak empirical support. We do not obtain any consistent evidence supporting both the tradeoff and the agency theories. In addition, we find that the firm’s SEOs behavior varies between rights issues and public offerings and across different periods along with the progress of China’s market transition. Our results show that Chinese listed firms in general behave similarly as their counterparts in other countries concerning SEOs decisions in that they issue SEOs when there are opportunities to take advantage of market overvaluation. These results are consistent with the well-documented convergence trend of corporate SEOs behavior of firms around the world. In addition, our findings challenge the conventional perception on Chinese SEOs that controlling shareholders use SEOs as a means to expropriate minority shareholders.