Abstract
I interpret Kant’s distinction between free and dependent beauty in a way that makes it possible for an object to be judged dependently beautiful without being judged freely beautiful. This is an alternative to the analyses provided by Malcolm Budd and Christopher Janaway, which both face a dilemma because they entail that an object must be judged freely beautiful in order to be judged dependently beautiful. The dilemma is that either the determinant of a judgement of dependent beauty is based upon non-aesthetic criteria (if the object is not freely beautiful), or else the judgement is superfluous for an account of aesthetic value. My analysis of the distinction allows both kinds of beauty to play a meaningful role in a theory of aesthetic value.
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