Abstract
ABSTRACT To address the Frege-Geach objection, proponents of the ‘forceful’ version of the act-theoretic approach to propositions appeal to the idea of force cancellation. How is that idea to be understood? In this paper, three models of force cancellation are discussed (and their shortcomings pointed out): the mereological model, the Brentanian model, and the – intermediate – transmutation model. Extant versions of these models are meant to account for force cancellation in speech, but they do not easily extend to force cancellation in thought. To overcome that limitation, a psychologistic version of the transmutation model is put forward, based on ‘simulation theory’.
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