Understanding Congress’ Role in Terminating Unpopular Wars: A Comparison of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars

Abstract

In this paper, I examine how a Democratic Congress reacts when a Republican President refuses to terminate involvement in an unpopular peripheral war. This inquiry proceeds in several parts; first, I outline a typology detailing the ways that members of Congress can influence the President. More specifically, I outline three strategies: enacting substantive legislations, framing exit strategies, and privately lobbying the President. I then turn to a theoretical examination of when Congress is likely to use these modes of influence to challenge the President; I devise two sets of hypotheses, one from the Democratic Peace Theory, and one from David Mayhew’s work, Congress and the Electoral Connection. On one hand, the Democratic Peace Hypotheses anticipate an assertive Congress, eager to confront the President and end a war; in contrast, the Electoral Connection Hypotheses expects that members of Congress will seek to avoid open confrontation with the President, and will instead use more indirect means to pressure the executive. I test these hypotheses in two case studies, examining Congressional activity during the final years of the Vietnam War (1968-1975) and the Iraq War during the period of 2006-2008. I conclude that the Electoral Connection Hypotheses provides the fullest explanation for Congressional behavior during the two wars.