Understanding Civil-Military Relations Today: The Case of Thailand with Implications for Emerging Democracies in Asia

Introduction: National Security and Civil-Military Relations PART I MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1. Officership as a Profession Professionalism and the Military The Concept of Profession The Military Profession 2. The Rise of the Military Profession in Western Society A New Social Type Mercenary and Aristocratic Officership Eighteenth-Century Aristocratic Institutions Preprofessional Meals: The Military Craft and the Natural Genius The Origins of Professionalism The Emergence of Professional Institutions, 1800-1875 European Professionalism: General Upton's Summary, 1875 Formulation of the Professional Ethic: The Autonomy and Sub-Ordination of War In Clausewitz's Vom Kriege 3. The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic The Meaning of the Military Mind The Professional Military Ethic 4. Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations In Theory The Varieties of Civilian Control The Two Levels of Civil-Military Relations The Equilibrium of Objective Civilian Control The Patterns of Civil-Military Relations 5. Germany and Japan: Civil-Military Relations In Practice The German and Japanese Patterns Germany: The Tragedy of Professional Militarism Japan: The Continuity of Political Militarism PART II MILITARY POWER IN AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 1789-1940 6. The Ideological Constant: The Liberal Society Versus Military Professionalism The Historical Constants of American Civil-Military Relations The Prevalence of Liberalism in the United States The Liberal Approach to Military Affairs The Military Hero in Liberal Politics 7. The Structural Constant: The Conservative Constitution Versus Civilian Control The Constitutional Absence of Objective Civilian Control The Framers and Civilian Control The Militia Clauses and Military Federalism: The Empire Within an Empire The Separation of Powers: Dual Control Over the National Forces The Commander in Chief Clause: The Political-Military Hierarchy Civilian Control and Constitutional Government 8. The Roots of the American Military Tradition Before the Civil War The Three Strands of American Militarism The Failure of Federalism: Hamilton's Abortive Professionalism Technicism Popularism Professionalism 9. The Creation of the American Military Profession The Dominance of Business Pacifism: Industrialism Versus Militarism Years of Isolation: The Dark and the Bright The Creative Core: Sherman, Upton, Luce The Institutions of Professionalism The Making of the American Military Mind 10. The Failure of the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise, 1890-1920 The Nature of Neo-Hamiltonianism Mahan And Wood: The Tragedy of the Military Publicist The Abortive Identification With Society, 1918-1925 11. The Constancy of Interwar Civil-Military Relations Business-Reform Hostility and Military Professionalism Reform Liberalism: The Pragmatic Usages of Militarism Military Institutions The American Military Ethic, 1920-1941 PART III THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, 1940-1955 12. World War II: The Alchemy of Power Civil-Military Relations in Total War Military Authority and Influence in Grand Strategy The Military Adjustment to Wartime Power Civil-Military Relations in Economic Mobilization The Fruits of Harmony and Acrimony 13. Civil-Military Relations in the Postwar Decade The Alternatives of Civil-Military Relations Postwar Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations Military Influence in American Society 14. The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs Political Roles: Substantive and Advocatory The Joint Chiefs in the Truman Administration The Korean War: the Generals, the Troops, and the Public The Joint Chiefs in the First Two Years of the Eisenhower Administration Conclusion 15. The Separation of Powers and Cold War Defense The Impact of the Separation of Powers The Separation of Powers Versus the Separation of Functions The Separation of Powers Versus Military Professionalism The Separation of Powers Versus Strategic Monism 16. Departmental Structure of Civil-Military Relations The Organization Problems of the Postwar Decade The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Legal Form and Political Reality The Comptroller: Superego of the Department of Defense The Role of the Secretary The Needs of the Office 17. Toward a New Equilibrium The Requisite For Security Changes in the Ideological Environment Conservatism and Security The Worth of the Military Ideal Notes Index

Since 1992, Thailand's young democracy has sought to ensure civilian control over its military. Yet since the 2006 coup, the military has become a powerful political actor and Thai democracy has eroded. As such, institutionalizing civilian control has become particularly challenging. This article examines civil-military relations in Thailand and argues that while civilian agents have initiated moves towards political outcomes of civil-military relations, agents’ choices and strategies have only been realized through the conditioning of structure—macro-structural, institutional and ideational factors. The study seeks to answer four questions. First, how have structure and agency played roles in explaining civil-military relations in Thailand's emerging democracy? Second, what strategies have civilian agents sought to use in attempting to achieve civilian control and what structural factors have conditioned strategy choices? Third, how successful have Thai civilian governments been in achieving control? Finally, what might be the future for Thai civil-military relations?

Before the wave of military coups and military governments from the early 1960s until 1990, the social science and history literature on civil-military relations in Latin America was virtually devoid of serious empirical research. In response to the surge in military governments in the region, this literature burgeoned. This article gives priority to landmark theoretical treatments, comparative research, and selected country studies with extensive bibliographical materials. While this article may have inevitably omitted the favorite books and articles of some researchers, it includes work illustrating diverse theoretical, empirical, and normative approaches to civil-military relations in Latin America. It does not include the much more extensive literature on comparative civil-military relations. In a broad sense, “civil-military relations” refers to the contact points, formal and informal, of the armed forces with civilians and civilian policymakers as well as civilian perceptions of military institutions and military perceptions of civilian and government institutions. Such contact points may include, among many others, military participation in various government agencies and policymaking councils, legislative oversight of military budgets, approval of promotions of high-ranking officers, appointments to military academies, definition of the curriculum in military schools and academies, collaboration on formation of defense and national security policy, and connections of military officers to political parties, voluntary associations, religious institutions, and other arenas in which civilian and military contacts occur. Media access to, and coverage of, the armed forces may also be an important aspect of civil-military relations. After first identifying the “pioneers” in the study of civil-military relations in Latin America, the sections of this article then focus on studies of the constitutional missions of the Latin American armed forces and their statutory authority, from internal policing to developing numerous economic enterprises, public works, and providing disaster relief. A subsequent section considers the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians both in normal times and under regimes of exception and emergency authority (state of siege, state of assembly, state of internal commotion, and other temporary suspension of constitutional rights and liberties included in almost all Latin American constitutions). Following the sections on formal and institutional treatments of civil-military relations, the article turns to the vast literature on the causes of military coups in Latin America, comparative and case studies of civil-military relations from 1959 to 1990, the transitions back to civilian government (1978–early 1990s), discussions of “civilian control” or “civilian supremacy” over military institutions, the literature on post–1990 civil-military relations in the region, and, finally, a section on the most recent research (2009–2020) on Latin American civil-military relations.

Articulation and Concordance: A Dialogue on Civil–Military Relations in Fiji

This chapter reviews democracy and governance in Asia. Contrary to the hopes of political scientists, economic development has fostered too few democracies in Asia. Asia’s political landscape is deeply flawed with oligarchic democracies in Japan and Korea; pro-business soft dictatorships in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore; Chinese client states in Cambodia and Laos; weak and fragile democracies in India, Indonesia, Philippines, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal; military-dominated governments in Thailand, Pakistan and Myanmar; and staunchly authoritarian states in China, North Korea and Vietnam. It is argued that Asia will never have decent middle-class societies and innovative economies without democracy. President Trump has made it clear that promotion of democracy and human rights is not a priority of his administration.

Civilian control of the military is a sine qua non for democratic consolidation. In the Philippines, the armed forces have played a major role in the country's authoritarian past. Yet, despite the advent of democracy, vestiges of authoritarianism have persisted. This chapter analyzes the successes and failures in the efforts of Philippine civilians — through the executive branch — to gain authority over their military, with the objective of achieving consolidated democratic rule. The Philippines provides an interesting case for the analysis of executive-security sector relations, precisely because since 1986 the executive has succeeded, more or less, in keeping the armed forces under control. As such, the lessons learned in this study can shed insight on other country cases. The analysis derives from a conception of civilian control that acknowledges the importance of security sector governance/reform, especially with regard to the need for civilians to achieve supremacy over the military. Generally, the executive branch is important for SSR because it is only in the executive branch that civilians directly stand as superiors to the armed forces. As such, executive branch civilians are in the best location to attempt to rein in the armed forces. The implementation of SSR requires the successful use of executive control strategies to rein in the military.KeywordsExecutive BranchHuman SecuritySecurity SectorQuezon CitySecurity Sector ReformThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Abstract: This paper aims to compare civil-military relations in Indonesia during Abdurrahman Wahid's (1999-2001) period with Turkey during Erdogan's (2003-2011) by looking at civilian control over the military. The study looks at the differences and similarities between the two countries and the causes of Erdogan's success and Abdurrahman Wahid's failure to control the military. In this research, the author used a qualitative approach. The results showed that there were similarities and differences in civil-military relations between Gus Dur and Erdogan, as seen from civil control over the military. The similarities could bee seen at the beginning of their reign. Abdurrahman and Erdogan had strong civilian control over the military so that they could reduce the military's role in politics with various policies issued. This strong control is also supported by political conditions, political elites, and society. However, there were differences in civil-military relations at the end of the Gus Dur and Erdogan governments. Civilian control over the military weakened at the end of the Gus Dur’s reign which caused him to fall from his position as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, whereas Erdogan’s civilian control over the military was getting stronger. The failure factor for Abdurrahman to strengthen civilian control over the military was a radical change. In contrast to Erdogan who made changes gradually with the support of politics and society.Keywords: Turkey; Indonesia; Abdurrahman Wahid; Erdogan; Civil-Military Relations

This study discussed the civil-military relations in the United States during George W. Bush's presidency（2001-2006）and focused on civilian control, notions and fulfillment of military professionalism. The key points included American civil-military relations theories, wars and military transformations led by civilians, civilian leadership styles, conflicts between the civilian and military top rankings, criticisms on civilian leaderships by retired generals, and reviews of civil-military relations theories. Civilian and military conflicts originated primarily from disagreements and arguments regarding military operation planning and executions in the Afghan and Iraqi wars after 911, and from dissatisfactions with Donald Rumsfeld's（then Secretary of Defense）leadership style from the generals. The changes in civil-military relations has several implications:（1）The norm theory of civil-military relations and the notions of civilian control were challenged again;（2）The armed forces became ＂partisan＂ and subjected to increasing political influence;（3）Civilian control often overpowers the military during war time, resulting in increased pressure of transformation; and（4） Civilian control remains the central belief and tradition of American civil-military relations. Tension and conflicts may occur; however, American civil-military relations generally resemble a dynamic balance.

In this chapter, the authors present their arguments in favor of studying civil–military relations in third wave democracies. Normatively and functionally, civilian control of the military is a crucial institutional prerequisite of the consolidated, “embedded democracy.” For democracy to survive, the power of the armed guardians of state security must be limited by strong institutions of control. Civil–military relations are thus a vital topic for democratization and autocratization studies and international and comparative politics, as well as conflict and security studies. Yet, the importance of the topic contrasts with the scarcity of carefully specified theories and systematic theory testing that would allow to identify the conditions under which elected governments and democratically established institutions succeed or fail in ensuring civilian control of the military. Moreover, studies on civilian control of the military and democracy often fall into the “fallacy of coup-ism,” equating civilian control with the absence of military coups d’état. In contrast, the authors argue that civilian control is best defined as the exercise of the will of the country’s elected leadership over the armed forces: why theories of civilian control should center on civilian leaders as relevant actors who can initiate change in civil–military relations. They argue that the effects of different degrees of civilian control on democratic political regimes should differ by substantive decision-making areas and affect different partial regimes of a democratic regime democracy in different ways. Finally, the chapter briefly introduces the data and explains the structure and contents of the following chapters.

This article undertakes a systematic inquiry of democratic development in Asia. It shows two main trends of democratization in south, south-east and north-east Asia. First, in most of the democracies the institutionalization of political rights exists side by side with stagnation or decline of the rule of law and civil liberties. Second, the quality of democracy in the different countries is growing further apart. While new democracies in north-east Asia are on the track to democratic consolidation, democracy in south Asia is on the edge or has already fallen victim to authoritarian renewal. In south-east Asia, democratic consolidation is stagnating. The article also provides for a systematic analysis of why and how defective democracies originate. It argues that not a single primary cause but a set of interconnected variables influences the track of democratic development. While ‘Asian values’, the type of colonial rule and ethnic heterogeneity give only weak support for democracy in Asia, socio-economic development, political institutions, stateness and political party systems are more important determinants. In the last section the article offers a sceptical outlook on the prospects for further liberal democratic development in Asia, arguing that for most young democracies in the region remaining a defective democracy is the most likely prospect in the near future.

Contemporary studies of African Civil-Military Relations have shown that more than 50 % of the African states have undergone one or more successful or abortive military coups. A number of theories have been proposed to explain Civil-Military Relations. The purpose of this paper is to test Huntington's theory of Objective Civilian Control with respect to Civilian-Military Relations in modern Africa. Following a brief overview of African Civil- Military Relations and focus on the question of who controls whom, the paper poses the same question relative to non-African Civil-Military Relations. In a more extensive, in-depth case study of Nigeria, the paper seeks to examine the level and source of military profes sionalism, whether or not Nigeria has ever been free of military intervention in its political process because of its high level of professionalism, and whether Huntington's argument has any validity. In addition, the role of the African military in Nigeria as a paradigm in African Civilian-Military Relations is examined by discussing when and why Nigeria achieved her nationhood, the causes and consequences of military intervention and the level of Nigerian military professionalism, the role of the military and the Civil War, and why professionalism is not a reliable deterrent to military intervention in politics. This discussion illustrates the fallacy of most assumptions in the Civil-Military Relations literature today. The paper concludes that Huntington's assumption that non-military intervention is a function of civilian encouragement of military professionalism and professionalization is spurious. Based on the Nigeran case study and cross-national observations, the data show that a high degree of professionalism and professionalization is not a reliable deterrent against African military activism and intervention in civilian affairs. The data support the findings that professionalization of the military alone would not deter the military from intervening unless it is accompanied by the military's complete satisfaction with civilian control. Without this satisfaction, the military establishment is likely to challenge and possibly remove the civilian control whenever the military is disenchanted with or envious of civilian rule. Drawing from studies on political anthropology, it is sound to say that African military intervention is normal and one of the fundamental aspects of African tradi tional Warriorism. In the final analysis, Objective Military Control is not unique to Africa. It is a universal political phenomenon in Civil-Military Relations today.

This article is about a puzzle: strong civilian control of the military may promote the use of force not lessen it. Existing theories about civil–military relations and militarism do not adequately resolve this puzzle because they neglect the link between civilian control and the legitimacy to use force. The argument here is that an increase in the civilian control of the military may promote the use of force by legitimizing it under specific cumulative conditions: the existence of a previous militaristic infrastructure in the civilian political culture, which is triggered by an external event, and is augmented by three mechanisms deriving from civilian control that increase the legitimacy of using force by reducing deliberative decision-making. These three mechanisms are: (1) the depoliticization of the military caused by reinforcing civilian control, so the professional opinion of the military reigns supreme; (2) the militarization by inflating threats and setting ambitious war goals to remove such threats, which balances out the aversion to sacrifice for war that civilian control produces; and (3) the transition produced by civilian control to a volunteer, technology-intensive, downsized military that reduces the stake of citizens in military policies. The plausibility of this argument is explored by reference to the cases of the United States, Israel, and Russia.

Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations

The literature encompassed within the area of civil-military relations (CMR) is extremely broad. The focus in this bibliography is primarily on CMR as a subfield of comparative politics in that it deals with the power relations between the military and civilians. This bibliography is concerned with the classic question, raised in the 1st century ce by Juvenal: Who will guard the guardians? From this perspective, CMR is generally about power and politics of an organization with a monopoly in arms to exercise political power. While foreign states and international organizations may influence CMR, particularly during democratic transitions, it is essentially a national phenomenon. International law does, however, pertain in most of the roles and missions the military are tasked with. Not included in this bibliography are the following topics: military history, strategy and doctrine, sociology of the armed forces including recruitment, gender, race, and health. Thus, important authors such as Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos will not be included. This bibliography will break new ground in four ways: First, in giving attention to military effectiveness as well as the traditional focus on civilian control; second, in giving attention to roles and missions currently executed by the military; third, in including non-democracies, democracies, and those in transition; and fourth, in including the roles of private contractors in the mix of civil-military relations. The six primary sections in this bibliography are the following: Democratic Civilian Control is mainly about the United States and its emphasis is on the military taking political power, even though the American military has never sought to take power. CMR in Contemporary Non-Democratic Regimes focuses on China, Russia, and Egypt as they are all globally important non-democratic regimes, with varied relationships between the military and civilians. CMR in Democratic Transitions is included as the military is a key actor in virtually every transition from the beginning of Third Wave of democratization, starting in Lisbon, Portugal, on April 25, 1974. CMR in the Context of Roles and Missions is included as it details that the military mainly implements roles and missions not involving conflict with other militaries, and includes the role of international law. The section on CMR Including Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness is included as attention must be paid to effectiveness in the different roles and missions for military organizations. And, finally military roles and missions assumed by Non-Military For-Profit Private Enterprises are included as involvement of private enterprise raises questions regarding the state’s putative monopoly of power and roles of the military.

Three questions loom large in the study of civil-military relations, and are fruitfully asked of the United States, Japan, and China. What accounts for the subordination of the military to political authority? To what extent is the military reflective of societal values? How do civilian and military leaders think about and manage the central function of the military, namely the use of force? We find that despite the very different record of civil-military relations across these three cases, models and conceptual tools originally developed to explain American civil-military relations do have analytical leverage over the Japanese and Chinese cases. These tools, however, must be modified to adjust to the cultural and historical context of each case, and lead to different conclusions about prevailing civil-military relations in each setting.