Abstract
Regional organisations (ROs) increasingly act as promoters of democracy by applying sanctions against members who do not comply with collectively agreed norms. Despite the absence of an official sanctions policy, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) does interfere in certain ways into member states’ internal issues in some cases of norm violations. This study empirically explores how and why ASEAN decides to interfere or not in such situations. The findings derived from case studies on Cambodia and Myanmar, drawing on evidence from documents, media, and interview data reveal novel insights on ASEAN regionalism in the context of non-compliant member behaviour. I argue that the informal approach to regionalism provides ASEAN with a lot of room for discretion in responding to members’ norm violations. The article identifies geopolitical preferences, extra-regional interference, and legitimation as explanatory factors for the RO’s varying punitive actions.
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