Abstract

FOCUS O AUSTERITY ANDTRADEUNIONRIGHTSINEUROPE Undermining the European social model Iln and/or countries level national/sectoral a shifting decentralise to clear ambition bargaining, collective company there several policy from level to Is countriesthereIs a clear policy and/orambitionto decentralise collective bargaining, shifting from national/sectoral level to company level STEFAN CLAUWAERT and ISABELLE SCHÜMANN are Senior Researchers at the European Trade Union Institute in Brussels InSomovia 14 his September address stated: 2011, to 'respect the ILO European for Director-General fundamental Parliament prinJuan on 14September 2011,ILO Director-General Juan Somoviastated:'respect for fundamental principlesand rights at workis non-negotiable: not evenin times ofcrisiswhenquestions offairness abound. Thisisparticularly important in countries havingtoadoptausterity measures. Wecannotusethecrisis as an excusetodisregard internationally agreedlabourstandards. ' A recent working paperoftheEuropeanTrade UnionInstitute CETUI') focuseson labourlaw reforms invariousEuropeancountries either triggeredbythecrisisor introduced usingthecrisis - falsely- as an excuse. The reportcritically addressesthelarge-scale deregulation of labour lawcurrently taking placeintheEuropeanmember states,in particular the lack of democratic foundations underlying the reforms, and their negative impact on fundamental socialrights and workers' protection. Evidenceshowsthat sincetheendof2008,the start oftheeconomiccrisis, publicauthorities and nationallegislators have takena rangeof measures to boost enterprise flexibility, including amendments to nationallabour law. In some countries, such as Hungary, aftera change of government (shifting totheright), thisled tothe acceleration of drasticchanges in labour law, even bypassing participatory consultations with, amongothers, the social partners, in particular thetradeunions.In otherinstances, thesestructuralreforms have been requiredor indeed forcedupon thesememberstatesby European and international institutions and organisations, suchas theEuropeanCentral Bank('ECB'), the European Commissionand the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'), the so-called Troika'. Examples areGreece,Ireland andPortugal where the reforms were 'agreed upon' betweenthis Troika and the respective governmentsin Memorandums ofUnderstanding. Inaddition, the European Union togetherwith the IMF has undertaken 'missions' toEuropeanmember states in economicdifficulties. In 2010, forexample, theywentto Latviato discussthe2011 budget withthe government, insisting thatit included measures to deliver lastingdeficitreduction, whileproviding adequatefunding forthesocial and healthsafetynets,public worksemployment , and job training to alleviatetheimpactof thecrisis on themostvulnerable partofthepopulation . Interestingly, the European Commissionhas nothad recourse to labourlaw and fundamental socialrights toascertain themaintenance ofminimumsocialstandards ; neither has itresorted to hardlawmechanisms, although ithasthelegislativecompetence to do so undertheTreaty. On thecontrary, theEuropeanUniontendstofollow itslongstanding trend ofcalling for labourmarket 'flexibilisation' (and labourlaw deregulation), as statedin a Communication in 2010: 'flexicurity policies are the best instrument to modernise labourmarkets: they must be revisited andadapted to thepost-crisis context, inorderto acceleratethepace ofreform, reducelabourmarket segmentation , supportgenderequalityand make transitions pay'. However,thereis no evidencethatthefinancial and economiccrisisis theresultof labour law provisions inthemember states. The labour law reforms (currently) being implemented in manyMemberStatesare thusjustified by the argument thatmaking labourmarkets moreflexibleis one ofthebestresponsesto thecrisis. In some countriesit consistsonly of piecemeal although significant deregulatory measures, while inothers itinvolves far-reaching overhauls ofthe wholelabourcode. Labourlaw domainsthat are mostaffected areworking time, atypical employment (fixed-term, part-timeand temporary agencywork)and theintroduction ofnewtypes ofcontracts (collective and individual), dismissal law,and collective bargaining. Indeed, in several countries fundamental changesare beingmade to industrial relations structures andprocesses whereby itisa clearpolicyand /or ambition todecentralise collective bargaining ,shifting fromnational/sectoral levelto companylevel.Examplescan be foundin Italy, Greece,Portugal, Romania andSpain.Apart from shifting theonustoother levels, there isoften the (additional) problem ofallowing lower-level bargainingoutcomesto deviateunfavourably from theprotection provided byhigher levelcollective agreements or even statutory legislation. Such collectiveagreements deal, for instance,with working timeand wages.Examplesofthelatter can be foundin France,Greece,Italyand the SlovakRepublic. Anothertrendis the adoptionof measures reviewingrepresentativeness criteria for social partners(forexample,Greece,Hungary, Italy, theNetherlands, Portugal Romania, Slovakiaand Spain) and extending what used to be trade unionprerogatives toother bodies ofworkers' representation (oftenat companylevel)(forexample , Greece,Portugal and theSlovakRepublic). Therearealso examplesofcountries - forexample Hungary andRomania - abolishing oratleast diminishing theroleofcertain(tripartite) social dialogueinstitutions , withthegovernment withdrawing from suchbodies.Thesereforms ofcollectivelabourlaw will definitely weakentrade unionrepresentation and actionatallbargaining levelsas theyaffect theverystructure of trade unionsas wellas their institutional meansofprotecting and representing workers. INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 6Volume 19Issue 22012 FOCUS □ AUSTERITY ANDTRADEUNIONRIGHTSINEUROPE Decentralisation of collectivebargaining to the lowest level weakens the level of protection (termed thesocialacquis) achievedso farbythe tradeunionsat nationaland local level,and it willaffect sectoralcollectivebargaining. It will also lowerthestandard of rights recognised so farand anchoredin legislation and collective agreements, as well as affecting fundamental employment conditions related to working time, pay, work organisation, workingenvironment andsocialprotection. The ETUI mappingexercisealso shows the lackof respectfordemocratic and participatory fundaments and procedures in passing the reforms, thusaffecting the hierarchy of social norms.For example,in...

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